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Lexical Modulation without Concepts 
Nicholas ALLOTT1 & Mark TEXTOR2 
 
ABSTRACT 
We argue against the dominant view in the literature that concepts (understood as the standing 
meanings of general terms) are modulated in lexical modulation. We also argue against the alternative 
view that ‘grab bags’ of information that don’t determine extensions are the starting point for lexical 
modulation. In response to the problems we outline a new model for lexical modulation that dispenses 
with the assumption that there is a standing meaning of a general term that is modified in the cases 
under consideration. In applying general terms we intend to conform with our linguistic ancestors and 
in doing so we take facts about the referents of these terms for granted. In cases of lexical modulation 
we become aware of facts we took for granted and we need to change the facts we take for granted in 
order to see ourselves as continuing in a practice. These changes result in utterances of the general 
term referring to different properties. In general, concepts are neither the starting point for lexical 
modulation nor the standing meanings of words. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Lexical modulation is much discussed in the recent literature on lexical pragmatics. The basic idea is 
that words have context-independent standing meanings that are ‘modulated’ when these words are 
uttered for specific communicative purposes. For instance, when you answer my question ‘Who can 
help me carry the piano and cook dinner tonight?’ by saying ‘John is a saint’, your utterance of ‘saint’ 
does not contribute to the proposition expressed the context-independent standing meaning of ‘saint’, 
the concept of a person recognized for his holiness by the church. The standing meaning of ‘saint’ is 
modulated and an ad hoc concept constructed. The ad hoc concept is part of the proposition expressed 
by an utterance: it is the meaning of a particular utterance of the word. Uses of words such as ‘green’, 
‘cut’, ‘saint’ therefore express occasion-specific meanings. 
In describing lexical modulation, linguists and philosophers have standardly made three 
assumptions (Wilson & Carston, 2007; Recanati, 2012): 
 
(A1) A word has a standing, context-independent meaning determined by linguistic 
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conventions/encoding; 
(A2) The standing meaning is a concept that has an extension; 
(A3) Utterances communicate structured propositions to which the utterance of a word contributes 
an ad hoc concept. 
 
It is generally assumed that words have stable and context-invariant ‘standing’ meanings. In a further 
step these standing meanings are identified with concepts – although the consensus here is shifting3. 
Concepts are psychological representations of properties. (See Wilson & Sperber 2002, 607 fn. 9) The 
extension of a concept is the set of all and only those things that have the property. In the limiting 
case, the extension of a concept is the empty set. Concepts are activated when one uses a word with 
understanding. Hence, they are conceived of as memory addresses that give access to information 
about a property/kind. 
The most developed version of the account, due to Sperber & Wilson and Carston, adds the 
following: 
(A4) Pragmatic lexical adjustment takes one from the standing meaning to a non-lexicalised 
concept whose extension is a sub-, super or combination of sub/superset of the extension of 
the lexicalized concept. (narrowing/ broadening). (The earliest publications of this view were 
Carston, 1997; Sperber & Wilson, 1998. Wilson & Carston, 2007, is a developed statement). 
 
In addition, both Recanati and the relevance theorists add: 
 
(A5) The concepts encoded (per A2) by words have associated stores of encyclopaedic 
information; the accessibility of this information is context-sensitive; and ad hoc concepts are 
constructed from this information, starting with the information that is accessible in the 
                                                 
3 It is not clear what Recanati’s settled view is. In his (2004, ch. 9) he explores the view that words 
have ‘semantic potentials’ rather than standing for concepts. This view rejects (A2). But in his (2012) 
he also offers a classical, definitional theory of word meaning, accepting (A2): see discussion of ‘cut’ 
below. Carston seems to have changed her mind about the issue between her (2010, §4) which refers 
repeatedly to “lexically encoded concepts” and her (2012), where she argues that the encoded 
meanings of words are not concepts. 
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context.4 
 
In this paper we will not discuss (A3) and (A4).5 In particular, we do not want (or need) to make 
general claims about the role of concepts in cognition here. We will focus on assessing the 
assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A5) of the standard theory and argue that neither context-independent 
concepts, whether complex or atomic, nor Kaplanian characters nor non-semantic abilities to re-enact 
situations are suitable standing meanings of words. Our positive suggestion draws on causal theories 
of competence that identify linguistic competence with an acquired social trait: one is competent with 
a word if, and only if, one is sufficiently inducted into a practice of its use. This view, we will 
propose, helps us to understand lexical modulation better than the standard theory and its descendants. 
 
2. Problems for the Standard Theory 
According to the standard account, pragmatic lexical modulation takes the concept expressed by a 
word as input and yields as output an ad hoc concept that is narrowed or broadened relative to the 
lexicalized concept (or, on some occasions, both narrowed and broadened). Lexical modulation 
affects the proposition expressed (aka ‘what is said’) and this helps explain the fact that different 
utterances of a sentence may convey different speaker-intended implications. Take example (1): 
 
(1) Mary: Who can help me move this piano? 
Paul: John is a saint. 
 
Grice and early linguistic pragmatics treated such cases as ones in which the standing linguistic 
meaning is not asserted, and what the speaker actually intends to communicate is a related 
implicature. Many contemporary theorists disagree, arguing that lexical modulation contributes to 
                                                 
4 Cf. Sperber & Wilson on interpretations of ‘soldier’ (2002, 19–20); Recanati (2004, ch. 2, § 2.3). 
According to Recanati, the ad hoc concept is simply whatever is the most accessible one in the 
context, while in relevance theory the most accessible interpretation is a candidate to be the correct 
interpretation but may be rejected, in which case another interpretation is constructed and tested etc. 
5 For a criticism of (A4) see Allott & Textor (2012). We are agnostic about A3. Nothing we say here 
is intended to deny that concepts play important roles in (inter alia) inference and categorization. Our 
main claims about concepts are the narrower ones that concepts are not the standing meanings of 
words nor the starting point for lexical modulation. 
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truth-conditional or ‘near-side’ pragmatics.6 
Evidence that the ad hoc concept ‘gets into’ what the speaker asserts (or ‘says’ in Grice’s special 
sense) comes from the intuition that logical operators such as negation can target the occasion-specific 
sense, as in the following rejoinder to Paul’s remark in (2)7: 
 
 (2) No, he’s not a saint: he only pretends to be helpful and self-sacrificing when he thinks it’ll 
make him look good. 
 
Another argument comes from neologisms, such as the ones in (3): 
 
(3) a. The boy porched the newspaper. 
b. She wristed the ball over the net. (Wilson & Carston, 2007, 237) 
 
Wilson and Carston argue that these newly coined verbs porch and wrist can have no encoded 
meaning, and “thus, if the ad hoc concepts PORCH*, WRIST* [...] do not contribute to the 
proposition expressed or asserted by these utterances, there is no proposition expressed or asserted at 
all.” (Wilson & Carston, 2007, 237) 
Consider a further type of example, utterances of apparently contradictory sentences, such as the 
one in (4): 
 
(4) He was upset but he wasn’t upset. [Said by ‘Kato’ Kaelin of O.J. Simpson in the famous trial.] 
(Carston, 2002a, 137; 2002b, 334) 
 
Intuitively, the thought that this sentence was used to express was not a contradiction. As Carston 
analyses it, “[t]he two instances of the word ‘upset’ were interpreted as communicating two different 
concepts of upsetness”, and the second one (at least) is modulated, such that it “carries certain 
implications (e.g. that he was in a murdering state of mind) that the first one does not, implications 
whose applicability to [Simpson] the witness is denying.” (Carston 2002a, 137). 
                                                 
6 The label ‘truth-conditional pragmatics’ is from Recanati (1993); ‘near-side pragmatics’ is from 
Korta & Perry (2006). 
7 See Cohen, 1971; Recanati, 1989. 
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Now assumptions (A1) and (A2) of the standard model are problematic. Many linguists and 
philosophers of language have come round to the view that linguistic competence cannot require 
knowledge of concepts. Why? 
First, if we take concepts to be specified by definitions, most words seem not to express concepts. 
It is widely agreed that hardly any useful word can be defined.8 
Second, what is the standing meaning of ‘cut’ that is modulated (or – if some uses are now 
lexicalised – was modulated in their first use) in examples like those in (5a–e) (after Searle, 1980)? 
(5) a. John cut the cake. 
b. John cut the lawn. 
c. John cut his hair. 
d. John cut his finger. 
e. John cut taxes. 
The classical, definitional, view is that each (lexical) word stands for a concept, where a concept 
determines (or is) a list of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. For example, 
Recanati’s preferred specification of the standing meaning of ‘cut’ is “something like EFFECT A 
LINEAR SEPARATION AFFECTING THE INTEGRITY OF (SOME OBJECT) BY MEANS OF 
AN EDGED INSTRUMENT.” (Recanati 2012, 185). Here the problem of providing a conceptual 
standing meaning has been offloaded to ‘effect’, ‘linear’, ‘separation’ etc., but these words (or 
features) used to specify the standing meaning of ‘cut’ suffer from the same problems as ‘cut’. 
Consider the following examples: 
 
(6) a. Obi-Wan cut the cake with his lightsabre. 
b. Fred cut the gruyère with the wire. 
 
Both seem perfectly felicitous: these are instances of cutting. However a lightsabre has no edge, and 
cheese wire need not – it could be circular in cross-section. So Recanati’s definition is not satisfied. 
One might want to say an occasion-specific sense of ‘EDGED’ is in play, and that lightsabre and 
cheese wire have an edge in this occasion-specific sense. If this is right, then ‘EDGED’ in the 
                                                 
8 See Fodor et al., 1980; Fodor 1998, chapt. 3 and 4. 
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definition of ‘cut’ seems not to refer to a fixed property.9 
Similar problems can be raised for the other components of the definition. One can cut a block of 
ice with a hot wire such that its integrity is not permanently affected, since the parts immediately melt 
together (cf. example 7). This raises the question: which properties do ‘affect’ and ‘integrity’ etc. refer 
to? 
 
(7) John: Have you cut the block of ice? 
Jim: Yes. 
John: But there are no separate parts. 
Jim: But I have cut it. The wire went right through. 
 
To summarize our objection: definitional specifications of meaning such as Recanati’s only work if 
the meaning of the words (or semantic features) in the specification are adapted to specific occasions. 
It seems impossible that all such specific occasions could be foreseen and incorporated into the 
definition. So the meanings of the words (or features) in the specification must themselves be context-
sensitive. 
A response to the first problem mentioned above is that lexical words encode atomic concepts, that 
is concepts which do not decompose and are not in general definable. Can such atomic concepts be 
the standing meaning of lexical words? A challenge to this view comes from what have become 
known as ‘Travis cases’ after their inventor. Consider the following examples: 
 
(8) a. This apple is green. 
b. This glass is green. 
 
The sentence in (8a) could be used to say something true of an apple that is green skinned. But it 
could also be truthfully used to report that an apple has an unusual interior colour. What then is the 
concept that ‘green’ encodes: a-certain-colour-on-the-outside or a-certain-colour-on-the-inside? 
Perhaps rather a property that is neutral between these. The example in (8b) seems to show that it will 
also have to be neutral as to whether the perceived colour is due to the reflection or the transmission 
                                                 
9 Our point here is related to what Bezuidenhout (2002, 124) calls ‘higher-level’ occasion-sensitivity, 
drawing on Travis (2000). 
 7 
of light. Similarly, the examples in (9) (cf. Chomsky 2000, 16–17) raise the question: what is the 
concept encoded by ‘book’– a type of physical object with printed pages or a collection of intellectual 
content? 
 
(9) a. This book weighs twelve pounds. 
b. This book, which is full of important ideas, has been published in paperback and hardback. 
 
What could be the atomic concept under which both intellectual contents as well as physical objects 
fall?  
 One alternative view is that one of the concepts is basic and the other is always derived from it. 
But this seems ad hoc unless some independent evidence can be produced. Another alternative view is 
that ‘book’ is lexically ambiguous: one string of speech sounds links to two distinct concepts. 
However this fails to distinguish ‘book’, whose senses are clearly related, from genuine cases of 
homonymy such as river ‘bank’ and financial ‘bank’. (See Pietroski, 2017, for more on this last point.) 
What is more, it seems that ‘green’ and ‘cut’ (and many other words) would have to be multiple 
homonyms linked to indefinitely many concepts. 
 A further option is developed by Wilson and Carston 2007. They propose a unified account of 
lexical modulation that builds on (A5). According to them, atomic concepts provide access to 
encyclopaedic information about the objects in their extension. All cases of lexical modulation consist 
in selecting encyclopaedic properties. In effect, all the work that was supposed to be done by concepts 
is now done by encyclopaedic information that is accessed via concepts, which are seen as mental 
files locked to properties. Is this a viable proposal? 
 In order to answer this question we need to look more closely at the notion of encyclopaedic 
information. For Wilson and Carston (as they say in a footnote: p. 256, n. 22) ‘encyclopaedic 
property’ is a shorthand for proposition that has an encyclopaedic property as a constituent: ‘each 
property should be seen as a constituent of a complete proposition’ (ibid). These propositions serve as 
premises from which conclusions are drawn that either satisfy expectations of relevance or do not. If 
these expectations are met, the propositions from which the conclusions are drawn count as expressed 
by the utterance10. Prima facie, this works in some cases. For instance, in the ice cutting case, the 
encyclopaedic property of separation may be activated at the cost of the permanence property. But the 
                                                 
10 In the terminology of relevance theory, they are ‘implicated premises’, for obvious reasons. See 
Sperber and Wilson 1986, 194–195; Allott 2013, 77–8. 
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assumption that we start from propositions specifying encyclopaedic information is problematic.11 No 
concept seems to determine an extension, so how could propositions that contain concepts of 
encyclopaedic properties serve as starting points in modulation? To make the problem clear we can go 
back to our ice cutting example. There are situations in which we need to modify the permanence 
concept that may be assessable from the cutting concept. If Wilson and Carston are right about 
modulation, we need to make inferences from propositions that contain concepts of encyclopaedic 
features assessable from our concept of cutting to arrive at the occasion specific ad hoc concept 
expressed by ‘cut’. But each of the concepts of encyclopaedic properties invoked by ‘to cut’ might 
itself need modulation to be applicable to the case under consideration. Hence, we need even more 
propositions and concepts to make further inferences and so on. In principle, we are embarked on a 
never-ending process.  
 
3. Problems for the Character View of Standing Meaning 
In view of such problems one may hold that standing meaning should, instead of a concept, be 
something that could be neutral between different concepts that use of the words expresses. One such 
proposal is that the standing meaning of a lexical word is a Kaplanian character. For example, Szabó 
(2001); Rothschild and Segal (2009); Kennedy and McNally (2010); and Hansen (2011), propose 
accounts of colour terms along these lines. More generally, Stanley has claimed that ‘all truth-
conditional effects of extra-linguistic context can be traced to [linguistic] logical form’ (2000, 391). 
On such accounts, the standing meaning of a word determines (or is) a function which takes a 
context as argument, and returns a semantic value which is contributed in the normal compositional 
fashion to the proposition expressed by the sentence used in context. In the examples in (5) the 
semantic value would be a mode of cutting. This view assimilates the semantics of lexical words to 
that of pronouns and other obvious indexicals and perhaps to degree-adjectives like ‘tall’. 
Here are two arguments against the view. 
                                                 
11 We assume here that Wilson and Carston don’t really hold that propositions ‘contain’ properties as 
constituents, but that the propositions under consideration contain concepts or at least some kind of 
mental representation of encyclopaedic properties. For while a view of propositions as truth-apt 
complexes of particulars and properties is defended in the literature by Neo-Russellians, it faces 
serious problems and is not in the spirit of Wilson and Carston’s general approach. If properties are 
constituents of propositions, the sentences ‘This animal is a groundhog’ and ‘This animal is a 
woodchuck’ express the same proposition, since being a groundhog is the same property as being a 
woodchuck. But the inferences we are prepared to draw when accepting the sentences are different. 
Hence, Neo-Russellian propositions are not well-suited to be the premises of our inferences. 
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First, the kinds of enrichment of meaning that may occur are so various that many variables or 
indices would be needed (Bezuidenhout 2002, 114; Wilson & Sperber, 2002; Pietroski, 2010). Wilson 
and Sperber consider the suggestion that the standing meaning of ‘have eaten’ might be a character 
which requires a contextually-supplied time span and object of eating to express a content. But as the 
following examples demonstrate, the outcome of lexical modulation is not constrained only to 
providing a time and object of eating, but can also specify place or manner of eating. (Plausible 
pragmatic enrichment is indicated by the material in square brackets.) 
 
(10) a. I’ve often been to their parties, but I’ve never eaten anything [there]. 
b. I must wash my hands: I’ve eaten [using my hands, rather than, say, being spoon-fed]. 
(Wilson & Sperber 2002, 611 – their examples 28, 29) 
 
Thus ‘have eaten’ would need four variables or slots, of which three (object, place and manner) 
presumably belong to ‘eat’. With enough ingenuity, examples can be constructed showing that 
enrichment can have still other dimensions. Sperber and Wilson argue that this is a reductio of the 
character/hidden variable account of context-sensitivity. Similarly, Paul Pietroski writes: 
 
If meanings are instructions to build concepts, we can grant that I-expressions have some covert 
indices, but not enough to track all the ways in which truth can depend upon context. (2010, 267)12 
 
To summarize our argument here: the proposal that the standing meanings of words are context-
independent characters is implausible in the face of examples that seem to show that lexical 
modulation can introduce new arguments. One could then claim that a lexical item in general encodes 
several different characters with different arguments, but this runs into the problems noted above for 
the view that they encode multiple concepts: it fails to distinguish polysemy from homonymy; and it 
in effect proposes open-endedly multiple ambiguity, which seems ad hoc. 
 
Secondly, Bezuidenhout, (2002, 113–4) and Collins (2007) argue against ‘hidden indexical’ 
approaches to semantics that they are ad hoc: there is no independent evidence – e.g. from syntax – 
for the variables or indices that they postulate. Worse, the syntactic positions that these elements 
                                                 
12 By ‘I-expression’ Pietroski means constituent of a natural language, such as a word, phrase or 
sentence, seen as a mental entity. 
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would need to occupy are impossible according to contemporary syntactic theory, so “if recent 
generative theory is correct, Stanley’s account is incorrect, or at least lacks the support he claims for 
it, for there is too little syntax.” (Collins 2007, 826, his emphasis) 
Where does this leave us? Lexical words seem to encode neither concepts nor Kaplanian 
characters. In the next section we will review varieties of lexical modulation that show the full 
breadth of the phenomenon. The examples considered will strengthen our case against the standard 
theory and prepare our criticism of a different, non-standard response. 
 
4. The Grammatical Flexibility of Lexical Modulation 
Words can move across syntactic categories in English and many other languages.13 For instance, ‘cut’ 
and ‘stop’ occur as nouns as well as verbs; ‘chicken’ as a sortal predicate and a mass term. We can 
also move in lexical modulation from, for instance, a noun and form ‘on the fly’ an ad hoc concept for 
an activity. Consider the examples (3a) and (3b) above, where ‘porch’ and ‘wrist’ are used as verbs. 
As we noted, Wilson and Carston argue that these novel verbs, coined for experimental work, cannot 
have had encoded meanings for the experimental participants. This seems correct. Here, the problem 
is that the concept encoded by the noun ‘porch’ would be the concept of an entity, while the ad hoc 
concept made up by the participants for the verb ‘porch’ would be that of an activity. It is difficult to 
see how the ad hoc concept can be a concept that subsumes a sub- or superset of the extension of the 
concept which is the supposed to be the standing meaning of (the noun) ‘porch’. Nonetheless it seems 
attractive to see this as a case of lexical modulation in which one adapts a concept for an occasion. 
Let us strengthen this point with a further example. Consider the examples in (11), which show 
that ‘down’, normally a preposition14, can be used as verb, noun and adjective (Brinton & Traugott 
2005, 38): 
(11) a. Put the book down! 
b. Down your drink. 
c. He has a down on her. / Marc Trestman takes heat for missed field goal on second down. 
d. I’m having a down day. 
 
Presumably for most speakers at least some of these are derived on the fly from the preposition 
‘down’, while some have become lexicalised in certain populations. For our purposes it does not 
                                                 
13 See Rayo 2013, 673. See also Carston 2012, 614–5, 621. 
14 See Huddleston & Pullum 2002, ch. 7; Pullum, 2013. 
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matter which is which, since lexicalisation presupposes that there was an occasion in the past when 
the modulation was genuinely novel. This is because it seems natural to treat historical lexical 
semantic change as the gradual habituation and eventual fossilization of repeated pragmatic 
inferences, as has been suggested by linguists of several different theoretical persuasions (Lyons, 
1977; Traugott & König, 1991; Sperber & Wilson, 1998; Traugott & Dasher, 2002; Wilson & Carston, 
2007). Assuming this is correct, there must have been occasions on which examples like (11b, c and 
d) resulted from on-the-fly modulation of the preposition ‘down’. This presents the standard view 
with a difficult problem: what could the DOWN concept be such that it can have all of the 
applications in (11)? 
 
5. Non-Semantic Standing Meaning and Lexical Modulation 
The conclusion of section 2 was that neither concepts (whether atomic or decomposable) nor 
Kaplanian characters are the standing meanings of predicate terms. There simply seems to be no good 
way to think of the standing meaning of ‘book’ (‘cut’) such that it is (i) a concept – whether atomic or 
not – that (ii) has as its extension all the things which can truly to be said to be books (events of 
cutting). 
One response takes the source of this problem to be the assumption (A2). If one gives it up, one no 
longer needs to find a concept that is the basis of all uses of a word. A non-semantic representation 
may serve as standing meaning precisely because it does not determine an extension/property. For 
example, the verb ‘to stop’ and the noun ‘stop’ cannot express the same concept. Yet, they can ‘come 
with’ the same non-semantic representation. In the literature one can find three main versions of the 
idea that to know a word is not to grasp a concept.15 
First, Barsalou has developed a theory of representation in which concepts are replaced by 
acquired abilities to simulate situations in ways that are specifically ‘tailored’ to purposes. (See 
Barsalou et al. 2008, 251.) Here is a rough outline and a telling example. After encounters with 
objects falling under a category we form a multimodal representation of members of the category that 
allows us to simulate encounters with members of the category. When activated in a context, the 
‘simulator’ simulates some but not all of its content, the simulation or situated conceptualization: 
 
For example, one situated conceptualization for [CAT] might support interacting with a 
playful kitten, whereas others might support interacting with a mean tom cat, or with a 
purring house cat. In this view, the concept for [CAT] is not a detached global description of 
                                                 
15 See Bezuidenhout 2002, 115ff. for discussion of some other non-semantic theories of lexical 
competence; also Carston 2012, §§3–4. 
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the category. Instead, the concept is the skill or ability to produce a wide variety of situated 
conceptualizations that support goal achievement in specific contexts. (Barsalou 2005, 626, 
our emphasis.) 
 
It seems wrong to say that the concept is the skill or ability to produce situated conceptualisations. An 
ability to simulate ‘cat-involving’ encounters is not a concept: it has no extension, is not a constituent 
of thoughts etc. We take it that Barsalou rather means that in explanations of human abilities one 
ought to replace concepts with simulators. This seems to be a step in the right direction. While a 
single atomic concept that purports to be of one kind of thing cannot be a concept of physical object, 
intellectual contents etc., one and the same ability may ground re-enactments of situations that involve 
all of these things. In order to imagine writing a book or buying a book, it might be enough to have 
had bought books, read books etc. and to re-enact these episodes. 
Barsalou’s replacement for concepts suggests a model for lexical modulation. It is the ability one 
brings to different contexts of utterance. The modulated meanings are the simulations that are 
activated when one has identified the linguistic form that belongs to a phonetically/form individuated 
word in a particular context. (See Barsalou et al. 2008, 250.) Only particular uses of words that 
activate simulations have ‘meaning’, the simulations provide the meaning. (ibid., 251.) 
Does this view help us to understand lexical modulation? Consider cross-grammatical lexical 
modulation. Even if you have only heard ‘swim’ used as a verb, you may able to grasp what someone 
says in uttering (12): 
 
(12) That was a long swim. 
 
On Barsalou’s model, the use of the verb ‘to swim’ activates the simulator for swimming activities. 
The step from simulating these activities to coming to understand that the result of such an activity is 
under consideration is not explained by the simulator. The crucial work is done by a further 
mechanism not covered by Barsalou. 
More importantly, the question is how we should think of situated conceptualisations. Do I 
simulate (a) interacting with a cat that is nice or (b) interacting with Tommy the cat I owned some 
years ago? Option (b) seems phenomenologically implausible. Often we have no particular cat in 
mind when assessing what someone said about cats. Option (a) therefore seems the better bet. But 
then we have re-introduced the problem we want to avoid. Don’t I need a general representation of a 
cat to simulate a cat in my home? If so, we can again ask how there could be such a thing that covers 
all the diverse applications we want and can make of ‘cat’. 
 13 
Second, Rayo proposes that the standing meaning of a word is a ‘grab bag’ (see Rayo 2013, 648), 
that is, a possibly heterogeneous collection of mental items, such as images, memories and 
encyclopaedic information. Grab bags are not the right kind of thing to determine an 
extension/reference, as Rayo notes: 
 
[I]t is not even clear what it would mean to say that an image, some encyclopaedic entries and a 
few memories determine a referent. (Rayo 2013, 657) 
 
The standard view assumes that in lexical modulation one moves from a concept with one extension 
to a concept with a different one. We have seen that modulation across grammatical categories (noun 
to verb, sortal to mass noun) is a problem for this view. Rayo takes the grammatical versatility of 
words to speak in favour of the grab bag model: 
 
[T]here is no need to use different grab bags for different grammatical categories. A mental 
image that evokes obstruction, for example, can be used to render salient the action of closing 
a valve when interpreting an assertion of ‘she stopped the flow of oxygen’, and to render 
salient a particular knob on a pipe organ when interpreting an assertion of ‘she moved the 
stops to control the air-flow into her organ’. (Rayo 2013, 673). 
 
A speaker who utters ‘She stopped the flow of oxygen’ and, on a different occasion, ‘She moved the 
stops to control the air-flow into her organ’ trusts (i) that she and her audience have similar memory 
images associated with ‘stop’ and (ii) that one and the same memory image can make an 
action/activity as well as a part of an object salient. Hence, one and the same grab bag suffices to 
sustain the formation of different ad hoc concepts corresponding to different kinds of grammatical 
categories. 
But what are the representations that bring to mind obstructions of various kinds? We think there is 
a dilemma here similar to the one faced by Barsalou. If the representations are memory images of 
particular obstructing events or objects, this seems a rather risky empirical hypothesis. Which 
particular obstruction that you encountered in the past do you think of when you understand the 
command ‘She stopped the flow of oxygen’? However, if we think that the obstruction which comes 
to mind is the representation of a type of event or situation, we have simply substituted the problem of 
context-independent word meanings with the problem of general, occasion-independent mental 
representations of obstructions. Which mental image can be used to bring to mind activities such as 
closing a valve, halting a car and objects such as a knob on a pipe organ such that ‘stop’ construed as 
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a verb and a noun applies to them? A mental image is open to many interpretations and can render 
radically different things salient. If lexical modulation consisted in the activation of such images, it 
would remain unclear how we ever would arrive at a particular truth-evaluable content. 
The third non-semantic account of word meaning is Pietroski’s view that words encode 
instructions to fetch concepts (2010; 2017). What concept is fetched may depend on the other words 
in the sentence, the context, the communicative needs of the situation and so on. This seems 
promising, since it avoids the problems that bedevil conceptual theories of word meaning, and 
explains how one word can be used to express different concepts. However, as Pietroski has 
developed the theory, a lexical item only contributes an instruction to fetch a pre-existing concept; 
concept building comes later, when these concepts are combined to make the thought conveyed by the 
use of a sentence. This is because Pietroski is only concerned with cases of stable polysemy, such as 
the material and intellectual senses of ‘book’. In one situation a language user encountering the word 
‘book’ will fetch the material sense; in another situation, the abstract sense is fetched. 
So far so good, perhaps, but the account has nothing to say about genuinely ad hoc lexical 
modulation. It is not plausible that the occasion-specific sense of ‘upset’ intended by Kato (example 4 
above) was already extant for his hearers to fetch. Similarly for genuinely novel metaphors and 
genuinely novel cross-categorical cases. Nonetheless, speaker and hearer are – often enough – 
somehow able to coordinate and understand each other in these cases too.16 
 
6. Going Beyond Non-Semantic Views 
The proposals discussed in the previous section are a step in the right direction. But they do not go far 
enough. In Barsalou and Rayo’s proposals, concepts play no role in modulation, but they are 
compatible with (A5) and in fact endorse the core idea: we associate beliefs, stereotypes, multimodal 
memories and so on with a word. In lexical modulation some but not all of this encyclopaedic 
information is activated. The activated encyclopaedic information is the ad hoc concept. We think that 
even this tenet of the standard view should be given up. One reason became clear in the previous 
section: if the information activated is conceived of as representations, we must again ask whether 
they are occasion-specific or not. If they are, we have not made progress. But our main reason is that 
in important cases of modulations there is no information that can be activated to form an ad hoc 
concept. 
First, suppose for the sake of argument that ‘cut’ encodes a concept of cutting. It is a mental 
address linked to a property and at this address encyclopaedic information about things having the 
property is stored. When you list the things you take to be widely held true about the activity of 
                                                 
16 Cf. Bezuidenhout (2002, 107–9) who argues that occasion-sensitivity does not reduce to ambiguity 
or polysemy. 
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cutting you will likely come up with a list like this: 
 
done with scissors, a knife or something like it. 
done to hair, hedges, cakes. 
stereotypical types of cutting: cutting paper, cutting hair. 
  
One can add further pictorial and auditory representations of cutting. However, on this list there is 
nothing about the length of time that the effect of cutting must last or whether something is only cut if 
it takes a further operation to join the results of the cutting back together. This is why some of the 
cases we considered have the surprising character they have. The example of the lightsabre as well as 
others make vivid both that there are facts we take for granted and that this is so in general only 
becomes recognisable in situations in which these facts no longer hold. We take these facts for 
granted by acting accordingly, but not because they are part of the encyclopaedic knowledge 
belonging to the concept of cutting, if there is one. Hence, while activation of encyclopaedic 
information often has a role in modulation, this is not always the case. 
Second, consider a Travis case: 
 
Pia’s Japanese maple is full of russet leaves. Believing that green is the colour of leaves, she 
paints them. Returning, she reports, ‘That’s better. The leaves are green now.’ She speaks 
truth. A botanist friend then phones, seeking green leaves for the study of green-leaf 
chemistry. ‘The leaves (on my tree) are green,’ Pia says. ‘You can have those.’ But now Pia 
speaks falsehood. (Travis 1997, 89) 
 
Assuming that Travis’ intuitions are right, Pia’s different uses of ‘green’ express different ad hoc 
concepts17. But neither imagining nor recalling green things in general nor green leaves in particular 
nor the encyclopaedic information attached to our green concept (if any) will result in the expression 
of the ad hoc concept understood by the botanist. Again a tacit assumption is in play, namely, roughly 
speaking, that leaves are green in virtue of a biological process. 
                                                 
17 The example is underdescribed. Is Pia trying to use ‘green’ in the same sense as before? If so, there 
is miscommunication. Or perhaps she realizes what the botanist wants to know but decides to mislead 
him. However, the questions raised about the roles played by context, speaker intentions and (speaker 
beliefs about) hearer expectations in determining the concept expressed are, we assume, orthogonal to 
our concerns here. 
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Our argument here is related to Searle’s (1978; 1980) notion of the ‘background’.18 Encyclopaedic 
knowledge – by definition – is mentally represented. But as he pointed out, many things that are taken 
for granted in the use of words are not represented. Our examples show that lexical modulation can 
turn on revision of these hitherto entirely tacit assumptions. If that is right, then it casts serious doubt 
on assumption (A5) and any account of lexical modulation as the construction of an ad hoc concept 
from activated mentally represented information. 
Now this notion of ‘tacit’ assumption needs further clarification. Searle’s notion of background is a 
first port of call, but not more. The background ‘is a set of nonrepresentational mental capacities that 
enable all representation to take place’ (Searle 1983, 143). We agree with the main contention, but 
Searle seems only to label a problem. For how do non-representational mental capacities enable 
representation? Searle has mainly dispositions and stances in mind. I am disposed to expect that a cut 
makes a lasting separation of parts. But this disposition is the disposition to form representations. 
Which mental dispositions are non-representational and yet ground and determine the truth-conditions 
of our representations? 
We will therefore approach the notion of tacit belief differently. Sometimes our beliefs are 
manifest in the ways we act. For example, my belief that the ice is thin is manifest in the ways in 
which I skate. (Ryle 1949, 134–5.) Assent to a sentence is just one such way of acting; it is a 
convenient way to identify beliefs and their contents. But we need a broader notion of belief to 
explain the behaviour of non-linguistic animals. Barcan Marcus has developed an account of this 
notion of belief, the object-centred account of belief. Her object-centred account of belief identifies 
belief with a differential disposition to a state of affairs: 
 
x believes that S just in case, under certain agent-centered circumstances including x’s 
desires and needs as well as external circumstances, x is disposed to act as if S, that actual or 
nonactual state of affairs, obtains. (Barcan Marcus 1990, 241) 
 
Believing that so-and-so does not require concept possession. For example, believing that the sun is 
shining is a differential disposition to the state of affairs of the sun’s shining, however described or 
presented. Similarly for the belief that unsupported objects fall. A belief may be grounded in mental 
representations, but it may also be a brute disposition, whether innate, acquired by exposure to 
environmental stimuli, or some combination of the two. 
Now when we apply words we are disposed to act in certain ways without ever having reflected on 
or articulated these dispositions. If something has been cut, we are disposed to act as if the separation 
                                                 
18 See also Recanati 2004, sections 9.4 and 9.5, on implicit features and hidden background. We build 
on these observations in our argument. 
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was one which could only be undone by special effort. If we apply ‘green’ to plants we are disposed 
to make inferences that take for granted that there is some cause of the colour inherent to the plant, 
and probably to act as if the life of the plant is still ongoing and so on19. These dispositions are the 
tacit assumptions that we make. Normally, we only realise that we make them when we are 
confronted with cases in which they do not hold. 
Here is an indirect illustration. (See Parfit 1984, 200f.) Imagine that science finally gets round to 
inventing a machine that scans you, makes a blueprint, destroys you and sends the blueprint through 
space to a distant planet where a physical replica is made. Have you travelled to the distant planet? Is 
the replica you? There are no answers to these questions that flow from our understanding of ‘human 
being’ or ‘person’. Why? 
 
To seek what is ‘logically required’ for sameness of person under unprecedented 
circumstances is to suggest that words have some logical force beyond what our past needs 
have invested them with. (Quine 1972, 490; quoted in Parfit 1984, 200; our emphasis) 
 
We acquired the use of ‘person’ taking unthinkingly for granted certain conditions. However, we are 
neither able to enumerate nor fully specify these circumstances (cf. Searle’s ‘background’). What we 
take for granted in using ‘person’ is that things are relevantly similar now to the situation in which 
‘person’ was established and used before, without being able to list all that we take for granted. In the 
situation described above we find out that some of the circumstances we took for granted are not met. 
For example, our actions towards a person manifest the assumption that people don’t divide or branch. 
When I meet with you my behaviour never reflects the possibility that it is ‘another’ you. 
Let us explore this idea further. The conditions we take for granted are states of affairs, for 
example facts about gravitational forces or available technology. We don’t represent these states of 
affairs when we use an expression and no problems arise for that use. We simply take unthinkingly for 
granted that the relevant facts, whatever they are, obtain. 
When it comes to lexical modulation two kinds of facts are especially important: 
First, facts about the way in which something possesses a property which were taken for granted 
in the acquisition of the general term need not hold on the occasion of use. For example, you may 
have acquired the use of ‘green’ from uses that applied the word to fruits and vegetables that are green 
in virtue of performing or having performed photosynthesis. When you apply ‘green’ to an object of 
these kinds you will then take for granted that the colour has a natural source, without considering 
examples like the one Travis made us aware of. 
                                                 
19 Cf. Keil’s (1989) work on the assumptions built into taking a kind to be animate, or artefactual. 
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Something similar applies to verbs like ‘cut’. Consider examples (6 and 7) again. The fact that the 
examples are surprising and provoke thought suggests that we took for granted that cutting effects by 
means of a sharp edged instrument a separation of parts that is not ‘self-healing’. It never occurs to us 
that this might not be so. In the example of the lightsabre an advance in technology brought it about 
that one condition we took for granted is no longer in place. Hence, we need to express a new 
occasion-specific meaning of ‘to cut’. 
Second, facts about the relation between observable similarities and kinds. For example, we take 
for granted that animals that look and behave like us belong like us to the kind homo sapiens sapiens. 
But we never considered that animals that look and behave like us may not have originated from the 
same ancestors. Are rational animals that look exactly like us but have evolved on Alpha Centauri still 
human beings? 
In sum: some cases of lexical modulation cannot be explained in terms of the activation of either 
concepts or encyclopaedic information. These can therefore not fully constitute an ad hoc concept. Yet 
in the cases we have been considering words have an occasion-specific meaning. How should we, 
then, think about lexical modulation and ad hoc concepts? 
 
7. Lexical Modulation and Causal Coordination 
Let’s approach this question from a different direction. There are independent reasons to hold that, in 
general, shared understanding of a word does not consist in shared knowledge of meaning, whether 
the meaning is conceived as a concept or not. Consider the following argument: 
 
There is no shared meaning of the name ‘Hesperus’ (referring to Venus) in English. 
Therefore, shared understanding of utterances of ‘Hesperus’ (referring to Venus) does not 
consist in (require) shared knowledge of a standing meaning/concept. 
Therefore: shared understanding of utterances of ‘Hesperus’ is a matter of social coordination. 
 
Different people use ‘Hesperus’ on the basis of different conditions (broadly speaking) that an object 
must meet to be Hesperus. There is no procedure that allows one to privilege one set of conditions as 
those knowledge of which constitutes knowledge of meaning of ‘Hesperus’. If there is no shared 
meaning of ‘Hesperus’, shared understanding cannot consist in knowledge of such a meaning. 
In what does it consist? In general, what binds several different things, either at a time or over 
time, together into one unity are causal relations between them of a particular kind.20 So in the case of 
words. What makes different people at a time or over time use a word with the same meaning is that 
the uses of the word are suitably causally related. Plausibly, what we mean when we say that someone 
knows a word is that person has an ability that allows her to successfully carry out the intention to use 
                                                 
20 See Williamson 2007, 123. 
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it as other people, in particular, its originators, use or used it. 
Note that practitioners need not decide or believe that they are following the same practice as 
others in order to participate in the same practice. They just need to actually do so. Sainsbury (2005, 
117f) provides a plausible necessary condition for a practitioner to continue to participate in a practice 
of using a word: his use must be sensitive to the information from earlier uses in the same practice. 
For example, I don’t count as continuing participation in the practice of using ‘gold’ if in applying the 
word I simply don’t take notice of the information associated with previous uses. I may not endorse 
the information associated with previous uses because I have a radically different view of, for 
example, gold. But for my view to be still a view of gold I at least need to register and reject some of 
the encyclopaedic information to count as continuing the practice. There need not be encyclopaedic 
information associated with ‘gold’ in the practice that all uses of ‘gold’ are sensitive to; it is sufficient 
that for every use of ‘gold’ there is some encyclopaedic information that the use is sensitive to.  
We can use this necessary condition to bring out what is plausible and what is implausible about 
grab bags without collapsing the practice view into the grab bag view. The associated information 
may comprise ‘items’ of various kinds as the grab bag view has it. Sensitivity to this information is 
required for continued participation in a practice. But the information does not play the role of 
standing meaning. For there is not one body of information to which all uses are sensitive. The grab 
bag view is mistaken in holding that the body of information plays a role in lexical modulation. 
Sensitivity to this information is needed for participation in a practice, but does not help to explain 
lexical modulation.  
A word has different uses if the uses can be traced back by the right causal route to different points 
of origin.21 For example, even if the encounter with the same substance had led different people to 
come up with the same general term ‘F’ completely independently we have still two different uses of 
the same phonetic/syntactic word with the same referent. Why? Because they cannot communicate by 
using ‘F’ without introducing each other to their uses. 
The intuitions about reference that support the causal/historical theory of reference pioneered by 
Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975) also confirm the proposed view of shared understanding.22 In this 
view the notion of meaning is only used to register the right kind of causal coordination between 
speakers. The word can be used with the same meaning because speakers are correctly aligned, not 
because the word has the same meaning. This suggests the view that linguistic competence with a 
word consists in being properly aligned with other users of the word: 
 
The measure of full understanding is not possession of a full set of metaphysically necessary truths 
but complete induction into a practice. (Williamson 2000, 211) 
                                                 
21 See Sainsbury 2005, 3.6 who develops this idea in detail for uses of proper names. 
22 See also Evans (1982) and Kaplan (1990). 
 20 
 
We take this picture of knowledge of meaning to generalize to all words apart from those whose 
meaning is determined by inference rules, if there are any.  
The causal integration model of linguistic competence supports and helps to explain cases of 
lexical modulation that don’t involve activation of encyclopaedic information by appealing to the 
intention to use a word as others do. If a speaker applies ‘green’ to something that is uniformly blue 
on both the inside and outside, her intention to conform her use of ‘green’ to ours and that of past 
users is defeated by her communicative intention23. However, there are cases that are similar enough 
to the original use so that they don’t undermine the assumption that the speaker intends to conform to 
prior usage. Pia’s case is one. Pia says ‘These leaves are green’ pointing to leaves she painted green, 
intending to conform to past use. On the one hand, we want to see Pia as using the word ‘green’ in 
conformity with previous uses of the word. On the other hand, we want to engage in communication 
on this particular occasion with Pia. Suppose that in the prior usage of ‘green’ in application to leaves 
you have been exposed to, ‘green’ was only applied to leaves whose greenness was a result of 
ongoing photosynthesis. If we encounter an application of ‘green’ to an object that is green for some 
other reason, we can see the speaker either (a) as conforming to the original usage of ‘green’ but 
inviting me to revise what I took for granted, namely facts about how objects have this property or (b) 
introducing a new use of ‘green’ (the speaker wants to create, rather than to conform). Option (a) 
allows the speaker to say something true about a subject matter and not to talk past you. Hence, (a) is 
preferable to (b) according to which the speaker endows ‘green’ with a new meaning. For this reason 
we speak of modulation of the meaning of a word and not of creation of a new meaning or a case of 
ambiguity. The audience could put their response as follows: the leaves are green (and the speaker 
conforms to prior usage) although I previously took for granted that when a plant is green that is an 
intrinsic property of the plant. But why should I restrict the use of ‘green’ in this way? The causal 
source of the colour of an object need not prevent me from seeing the colourwise similarity between 
the colour of the leaves and, say, the colour of a piece of jade. 
If I no longer take the fact about the cause of the colour for granted, accepting the utterance of, say, 
‘These leaves are green’ will result in a shift in inferential dispositions and dispositions to act. In 
general, if we accept what a specific utterance says then we have occasion-specific inferential 
dispositions.24 Consider now a speaker who realises what the biologist is interested in, and says to him 
‘The leaves of this plant are green’. If he appreciates the speaker’s communicative intention and her 
                                                 
23 Her communicative intention could be satisfied in various ways: e.g. she may be able to 
successfully communicate using ‘green’ loosely or metaphorically, depending on the circumstances. 
24 There are different ways to think about these inferential dispositions. Corsentino (2012, 541) talks 
about perspectives on properties as cognitive dispositions, that is dispositions to make inferences on 
particular occasions. 
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conformity intention, he will now be primed to infer that the plant demonstrated is green intrinsically 
(rather than extrinsically) and act accordingly. 
Note that we are not claiming that talk of practices fully explains the abilities that language users 
possess. It is obviously desirable to say in addition as much as possible about the cognitive equipment 
that underlies and makes possible the acquisition and use of such lexical competences. (See the next 
section for some suggestions.) We do think that theorising about linguistic meaning needs to pay more 
attention to the variety and specificity of usage25. 
A good example of the complexity of actual usage is modulation across syntactic categories. 
Consider again cases like ‘porch’ and ‘wrist’ used as verbs. Here, too, consideration of the intentions 
of the speaker is helpful. In such cases none of the intentions wins. For on the one hand we do want to 
see the speaker as conforming to past uses of a word or word fragment: the similarity of the new verb 
‘porch’ and the noun ‘porch’ is not accidental. The speaker used ‘porch’ as a verb because there is 
already a practice of using the noun ‘porch’. But on the other hand his manifest intention to speak 
about an activity, which can be inferred (non-demonstratively) from the syntactic parse of the 
sentence, forces us to see him as deviating from the original practice of use. We have here then a 
hybrid use that conforms as well as deviates. The theory proposed has room for such cases and this is 
an advantage. We don’t need to assume in such cases of cross-category modulation either ambiguities 
or ‘amorphous’ concepts and properties. 
When there are already two related words of different categories, such as the noun and verb pairs 
‘fly’ and ‘flight’, or ‘stop’ and ‘stop’, the situation is more complex still. Here a fully competent 
speaker has two related but distinct abilities. 
Let us take stock of our proposal so far. It might be thought that a theory which dispenses with the 
assumption (A2) that standing meanings of words are extension-determining concepts must lack the 
resources to distinguish neologisms from conventional uses, since it cannot claim that conventional 
uses are just those in which the concept expressed is equal to the concept encoded. This may be a 
problem for some such theories. It is a strength of our theory that it has an account of this distinction 
(in terms of speaker intentions). 
A further distinction that might seem to be lost by a theory that denies A2 is that between literal 
and non-literal use, since (similarly) it cannot claim that literal uses are just those in which the 
concept expressed is equal to the concept encoded. We argue in the next section that the distinction 
                                                 
25 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that this was what we should want to 
say. 
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may be best understood instead in terms of I-analytic features. 26 
 
8. I-Analyticity 
In case (a) above no new sense is introduced, although background assumptions are revised. On the 
other hand, novel cross-categorical uses necessarily introduce a new sense: there was no sense 
previously for ‘porch’ used as a verb. Now there are also cases of lexical modulation without category 
change that introduce new senses, or try to. To account for the contrast we will draw on the notion of 
I-analyticity. 
Some linguists and philosophers have tried to develop a theory of I-analyticity, according to which 
some words encode necessary conditions that are part of one’s linguistic competence. For example, 
they claim that one cannot be competent with the verb ‘persuade’ unless one grasps the link between 
‘persuade’ and ‘intend’ such that literal utterances of sentences of the form “If X has persuaded Y to 
do Z then Y intends to do Z” (with X, Y, Z non-vacuously filled) are all true (Rey 2003/2013, §4.4, 
citing Chomsky). On this view, words have partial meanings: for each word there is a list of necessary 
but in general not jointly sufficient conditions (Chomsky 1975, 233 fn. 13; 1977, 142; Moravcsik, 
1981, 1998; Laurence & Margolis 1999, 52)27. This view is popular in linguistic lexical semantics 
(e.g. Pinker, 1989; Jackendoff, 1990; Levin & Rappaport Hovav, 1995, 2005); one reason is that there 
is independent evidence for some postulated semantic features from their role in licensing syntactic 
alternations (Leben, 2015). If there are such I-analytic facts, then what it takes to know a word 
includes being competent in the word’s I-analytic entailments. 
This provides a natural characterisation of some cases which attempt to introduce a new sense. If 
‘persuade’ I-entails ‘intend’ in the I-languages of speaker and hearer, but the speaker uses (or tries to 
use) ‘persuade’ in a different way, then she is attempting to introduce a new sense for the word, either 
to replace the existing sense or to stand alongside it (creating lexical ambiguity). Contrast this with 
novel utterances of sentences with ‘cut’ in (5 a–d). These can be seen as using the existing resources 
of the language in a way that had not previously occurred to its speakers. And contrast that with the 
                                                 
26 We owe thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out that we had in effect answered these 
objections but had not explained that we were doing so. 
27 There are two different versions of these theories (Leben, 2015). According to the first, the 
components of word meanings are themselves words (Lakoff, 1965; McCawley, 1968; Wierzbicka, 
1996). According to the second variant the components are not words (e.g. Glanzberg, 2011): this is 
the line usually taken in neoclassical lexical semantics (Laurence & Margolis 1999, §5). For a similar 
proposal coming from a very different tradition, see Sainsbury (2006, 253) on the givenness and 
specificity features of ‘the’. 
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initial use of (5e) ‘cut taxes’ which presumably dropped I-analytic features – nothing is separated 
from anything when taxes are cut – and eventually led to the lexicalisation of a new sense.28 
Equally, if there are I-analytic features, then these provide a way, consistent with our main 
proposal, to distinguish metaphorical cases from literal uses. The speaker who first used ‘green’ 
metaphorically in the description of a naïve or innocent person was using it in a way that drops what 
is (let us suppose) one of the I-analytic features of ‘green’, namely coloured. However she does not 
propose that this feature is dropped for all future utterances of the form ‘green’. She initially proposes 
only that it is suspended for that very use. (But that use may catch on, and eventually become 
lexicalised.) Similarly, novel uses of (5e) ‘cut taxes’ were metaphorical. Of course, once the new 
sense of ‘cut’ has become established, uses of ‘cut taxes’ are literal uses of that new sense. Again 
contrast this with the various uses of ‘cut’ in (5 a–d), and with ‘green’ used for leaves that have been 
painted green or objects that are green on the inside. No I-analytic feature (we suppose) has to be 
suspended in these cases. We can say that they are all literal uses, while uses that suspend an I-
analytic feature are metaphorical ones. 
Our intuitions may be less clear about some cases, such as uses like ‘cut with a lightsabre’ where 
(we have suggested) a necessary feature, ‘EDGED’ in this case, is operative but understood 
atypically. Our perplexity fits well with this model: this is neither a prototypical literal use nor a 
prototypical metaphorical use. 
 
9. Conclusion 
We hope to have given reasons to reject the main tenets of the standard theory of lexical modulation 
as well as modifications of the theory. There are ‘deep’ cases of lexical modulation that concern 
neither concepts, whether atomic or complex, nor encyclopaedic information. On the basis of a 
causal-historical model of shared understanding we have given a description of such cases of lexical 
modulation. According to the proposal, one understands a word if, and only if, one is sufficiently 
inducted in the practice of using it. And one is so inducted if one can intend to conform to prior usage. 
All uses of a particular word with the intention to conform to past use are bound together by that 
                                                 
28 We do not attempt here answers to the notoriously difficult questions of what makes some uses 
catch on and become lexicalised, while others are ephemeral; or what decides whether a new sense 
supplants an existing one (e.g. example 13c, ‘hound’) or co-exists with it (e.g. ‘green’ used both for a 
colour and for naivety). An account might bring together work in historical linguistics on 
lexicalization and language change (e.g. Brinton & Traugott, 2005; see also Traugott, 2012) with 
work on the interplay of cognitive and social processes in the spread of cultural practices, knowledge 
etc. (e.g. Sperber, 1996; Sperber & Hirschfeld, 2004). 
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intention and the history of use. Lexical modulation of a word puts into play a new sense when the 
intention of a speaker to conform to prior usage is in conflict with her communicative intention. In 
‘deep’ lexical modulation this conflict is plausibly resolved by abandoning one/some of the 
assumption(s) about the reference we have taken so far for granted. 
The causal-historical model also covers cases in which, plausibly, encyclopaedic information is 
activated. For in many cases speakers who are causally integrated with others will have similar 
beliefs/encyclopaedic information ready to be activated. But the model proposed is more general and 
therefore preferable, we think. We have also shown that I-analytic features (if they exist) may be 
retained in lexical modulation (as in literal use) or dropped, or retained but understood in a new way. 
In the cases we discussed, lexical modulation looks like a widening or narrowing of the extension. 
For example, one might say that in the Travis examples the extension of ‘green’ seems, relative to 
previous uses of the word, to have been widened to leaves that have been painted green or to objects 
that are green on the inside. This is a welcome consequence as we can explain why the broadening 
description seems plausible even though there is no concept that is the word’s standing meaning. 
What about cases that have been described as ‘narrowing’? Consider the examples in (13): 
 
(13) a. Churchill was a man. 
b. Buying a house is easy if you’ve got money. (both Wilson & Carston 2007, 232) 
c. Old English ‘hund’ (dog) > Modern English ‘hound’ (a specific type of dog) 
 
In cases like (13a) and (13b), and in the novel uses that led to the lexical change in (13c), the hearer 
has to/had to infer from the context that the speaker intended some restriction that does not exist in the 
general use of the word. Thus the concept expressed on that occasion may have a narrower extension 
than the concepts expressed by average or stereotypical uses of the word. Again, we can see why the 
narrowing description seems plausible without needing to postulate any concept that the word 
encodes.29 
                                                 
29 We presented predecessors of this work at the Polysemy Workshop at the University of the Basque 
Country in Vitoria Gasteiz in 2012, and in 2014 at the Research Seminar for Language and Cognition, 
King's College London, the Colloquium of the Center for the Study of Mind and Nature, and 
the conference ‘Word Meaning’ at Cumberland Lodge, and in 2016 at the University of Maryland 
College Park Linguistics and Philosophy Colloquium. We thank all audiences for feedback and 
discussion. Thanks in particular to Robyn Carston, Alison Hall, Michael McCourt, Georges Rey, 
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